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Political Connection and Firm Value 
 
Abstract 
We study the effect of political connection (PC) on company value in an environment 
where low PC is due to better institutions and not confounded by favorable social/cultural factors.  
We find that in Singapore, the only country that fits this description, PC in general adds little to 
the value of a company.  However, in industries that are subject to more stringent government 
regulation, PC appears to be somewhat important.  Robustness checks show that alternative PC 
variables give rise to similar results, and the addition of control variables do not drastically 
change the findings.  PC firms have higher managerial ownership and tend to be smaller than 
non-PC firms, rendering them more susceptible to poorer governance practices.  We show that 
the presence of PC directors somewhat neutralizes such potential negative effects.  PC firms are 
associated with good governance practices such as non-duality in their Chairman and CEO and 
fewer executive directors. 
 
JEL Classification: G32; G34; O53 
Keywords: Political connection; corporate governance; firm value; Singapore 
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Political Connection and Firm Value 
 
I. Introduction 
While the value of political connection to firms has received considerable research 
interest (Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009), Imai (2006), Khwaja and Mian (2004), Ang and 
Boyer (2000)), the question of whether political connection enhances firm value has mixed 
findings.1  When the value of political connection is found to be high, they are often in countries 
with higher levels of official corruption.  We do not know whether political connection is as 
valuable in the absence of political corruption, i.e., is political corruption a pre-condition for 
political connection to be valuable?  To test this hypothesis, we examine the impact of politically 
connected directors on the value of firms operating in an environment where the perceived level 
of corruption is comparatively low.2
We select Singapore for the study because, although low in corruption, it is unique 
among low corruption countries.  Unlike other low corruption countries where the results may be 
attributed to some shared social and/or cultural factors with its neighboring countries, Singapore 
 
                                                 
1 Examining 47 countries, Faccio (2006) finds a positive relation between political connection and firm value. 
Specifically, she finds that political connection is common in countries that are highly corrupt. Goldman, Rocholl, 
and So (2009) show positive abnormal stock returns following the announcement of a politically-connected 
individual nominated to the board. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), however, find a negative relation between 
politically-connected CEOs and post-IPO performance in China. 
2 According to Transparency International, an international non-governmental organization addressing corruption 
including but not limited to political corruption, Singapore ranks the cleanest country out of 178 in the world in 
2010, together with Denmark and New Zealand, with a corruption perceptions index of 9.3. Finland and Sweden 
complete the top five least corrupt countries that year. 
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has an uncanny need for much stronger institutions as it is surrounded by countries that are 
perceived to be inherently more corrupt.  For example, the 2010 edition of the global corruption 
perceptions index released by Transparency International lists New Zealand, Denmark, and 
Singapore as joint first-ranked holders of the world’s least corrupt countries.  Among these three, 
New Zealand’s closest neighbor, Australia, is ranked #8 on the same index; Denmark, together 
with neighbors Sweden and Finland are ranked within the top five in 2010.  By contrast, 
Singapore’s immediate neighbors in Southeast Asia include Malaysia (ranked #56), Thailand 
(ranked #78), Indonesia (ranked #110), Vietnam (ranked #116), and the Philippines (ranked 
#134).  Furthermore, the social and cultural background of Singaporeans, as derived from their 
ethnic background, also does not favor low corruption.  Of the countries of ancestral origin 
among Singapore’s three major ethnic groups (Chinese, Malays, and Indians), China ranked #78, 
Malaysia ranked #56, and India ranked #87.  Thus, even if we find political connection not to 
benefit private firms with connections in both Scandinavian countries and Singapore, the 
underlying causes are inherently different.  Singapore has to rely on having strong institutions to 
achieve low corruption, one that is not confounded by social and cultural factors.  Its uniqueness 
makes it a natural experiment to study how institutions may limit the role of political influence in 
businesses.  We feel that it is worthwhile to study the role of strong institutions such as those in 
Singapore.  Specifically, we examine this issue within the context of post-IPO firms in 
Singapore.3
                                                 
3 It has been well documented in the existing literature, e.g., Ritter (1991), Ritter and Welch (2002) that firms with a 
higher level of IPO underpricing tend to underperform over the long run.  In the present study, the sample of 
politically connected firms has a lower, but not statistically significant, level of underpricing than non-politically 
connected firms.  Moreover, IPOs allow us to investigate the wholesale introduction of all politically connected 
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Previous studies have not specifically investigated low-corruption countries and did not 
conclusively argue that the effect of political connection is independent of corruption.  We 
investigate the value of political connection under a political regime with low perceived 
corruption and document that firms operating under such a political environment benefit little, 
except for firms in highly regulated industries, from their political connection.  This new finding, 
in contrast to those in previous studies that find strong value in political connection under a 
corrupt political regime, clarifies the role of political corruption and the channel that values are 
created for such firms and/or their managers.  A corrupt political environment increases the 
probability that firms’ connected politicians are willing and able to extract rents from the public 
and competitors on behalf of their firms.  Such an environment also gives politically connected 
individuals certain incentives as they may receive a share of the extracted rents in the form of 
personal payoffs or campaign contributions with low perceived personal risks. 
Politically connected firms may benefit through easier access to debt financing, lower 
taxes or stronger market power.  Such benefits are usually greater when the firm operates in a 
country with a high level of corruption among its officials, low protection of property rights, a 
highly interventionist government or a non-democratic government (Faccio, 2006).  In addition 
to gaining economic benefits, some firms may appoint politically connected directors for their 
knowledge and experience with government procedures, their insights in government actions, 
their ability to enlist the government for the firm’s interest at the expense of competitors, or to 
forestall government action inimical to the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001).  Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2009) find that companies connected to the US Republican Party experience an 
                                                                                                                                                             
directors the first time the firms are introduced to the capital market.  The design eliminates the need to adjust for 
the timing of an anticipation effect and the incremental value of a single appointee in later years.   
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increase in value following the Republican Party’s win in the 2000 Presidential Election while 
companies connected to the Democratic Party saw a stock price plunge.  In Singapore, firms may 
appoint politically connected directors to their board to signal stronger corporate governance.  
This argument is in line with the finding of Ang and Ding (2006) that government-linked 
companies in Singapore are associated with stronger corporate governance and higher firm 
valuations. 
 Political connection may add value to either the connected firms and/or their managers.  
An example is the contrast between Indonesia and China.  Managers of Indonesian firms are 
often the largest shareholders, where 84.6% of the management is affiliated with the controlling 
owners (see Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000)).  The extant literature highlights evidence 
from Indonesia where investors view political connection to the country’s President as valuable, 
accounting for one-fourth of a firm’s value and adding 33% to firm value (Fisman, 2001).  Thus, 
because managers’ stakes in the firms are large, a substantial share of rent extraction accrues to 
the firm.  In China, however, the average management ownership of Chinese firms at the time of 
IPO is a mere 0.298% (Li et al. (2007) and firms with political connection underperform their 
counterparts that have no political connections by 37% over a three-year post-IPO period (Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang, 2007).  This finding is consistent with the view that managers with a low 
personal ownership in their firms mainly divert the rent extracted from political connection to 
themselves and the connected politicians.4
                                                 
4  Other forms of political connection that is related to value reduction include having lower quality political 
appointees as managers and running the business as a political bureaucracy.  It is also possible that Chinese investors 
fail to understand that it takes ownership alignment to have rent extracted from political connection to flow to the 
firm and not the managers. 
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The issue that we address in this article is whether political connection enhances firm 
valuation when political corruption is low.  Underlying the hypothesis is the condition that 
significant rent extraction is made possible only under an environment of high political 
corruption.  The alternative hypothesis is that political corruption may not be necessary for 
politically connected directors to help create value for their firms.  For instance, politically 
connected directors who are non-corrupt may be able to influence their firm’s governance 
structure by aligning it with the government’s policy initiatives, which may lead to boosting 
investors’ confidence and a resultant higher firm value in some cases.5
Singapore is in a unique situation as the only low corruption country in a region 
dominated by high corruption countries.  In contrast, Denmark and New Zealand, which are 
jointly-ranked with Singapore as the top three least corrupt countries, have neighboring countries 
that are also low on corruption.  But Denmark and New Zealand are less suitable for studying the 
issue raised here as their environment of political corruption, the willingness of politicians to 
abuse their powers, and firms or managers engaging in political rent extraction, may be related to 
an unspecified common factor – their shared social and/or cultural environment with its 
neighboring countries.  Thus, Singapore provides a more ideal natural experiment for our study.
   
6
                                                 
5 An example is from Ferguson and Voth (2005), who report that firms that are politically linked to Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany outperform the market by 5-10%.  However, this should be properly viewed as a consequence of the 
skewed policy of fascisms in favor of a few companies. 
 
6 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has, in June 2004, indicated in its financial system stability assessment of 
Singapore that a competent judiciary is one of the cornerstones for Singapore’s legal system, giving it top marks for 
the reliability of its legal, supervisory, and institutional framework. 
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In this article, we define a company to be politically connected if at least one member on 
its board of directors is (1) a former cabinet minister of the Singapore government,7
The results of this paper show that in a country such as Singapore, where political 
corruption is relatively low, political connection adds little to the value or performance of the 
company.  However, upon further careful investigation, we find that in certain industries, 
political connection appears to be more important than in others.  These are those that belong to 
industries that tend to be subject to more stringent government regulation such as electrical and 
electronic equipment (SIC 36), holding and other investment offices (SIC 67), general building 
contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred products (SIC 20), and rubber and miscellaneous plastics 
products (SIC 30).  There is evidence that companies in such industries may find that having 
directors who are politically connected could have a positive and significant impact on their 
firm’s value.  We further examine the characteristics of these firms and find that, among these 
firms, those with a politically connected Chairman/CEO or Senior Civil Servant on their board 
benefit the most in terms of a positive effect on firm value. 
 (2) a serving 
or ex-member of parliament (MP) or (3) a current or former senior civil servant of the Singapore 
government.  We investigate the relation between political connection and firm valuation within 
the context of newly listed companies from 1998-2006.  We employ Tobin’s Q as a proxy for the 
value of newly listed firms in Singapore for each of the three years after their issue and compare 
the differences in value between companies with and without political connection.  We also 
explore the relationship between political connection, corporate governance, and firm value. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a brief 
introduction of corporate governance in Singapore.  Section III reviews the prior literature on 
                                                 
7 Currently serving ministers of the government are not permitted to sit on corporate boards.  However, no such 
restrictions are imposed on members of parliament and senior civil servants. 
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political connection as well as develops the hypotheses.  The sample data and research 
methodology are detailed in Section IV.  Our research outcomes and results are documented in 
Section V.  Section VI summarizes the study and provides some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Background of Corporate Governance of Singapore 
Following loosely the Anglo-American model, Singapore’s corporate governance system 
revolves around capital market controls of managerial behavior (Prowse, 1998).  The capital 
market in Singapore is thin (less than 500 listed companies were on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange in 2002, growing to about 800 firms in 2008), and equity is firmly held among a small 
group of investors including the government of Singapore, multinational and regional 
corporations, wealthy individuals, and entrepreneurial families.  Government-linked corporations 
(GLCs) account for approximately 24% of the stock’s market’s total capitalization of US$287 
billion and control over a tenth of the country’s economic output (Ang and Ding (2006)).  
Therefore, any study of corporate governance in Singapore would not be complete without 
understanding the role and governance structure of Singapore’s GLCs.  Typically, GLC boards 
are populated by senior civil servants and political appointees, making board appointments an 
oblique method for monitoring or controlling corporate activities and business practices by the 
government.  The government centered corporate governance system can be potentially effective 
if strong governance is regarded as keeping with effective industrial policy (Phan and Yoshikawa 
(2005)).  To buttress this view, Singaporean GLCs have been shown to have higher valuations 
and better corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs, even after controlling for 
firm specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, firm size, and foreign ownership (Ang 
and Ding (2006)). 
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GLCs in Singapore are largely corporate investments by Temasek Holdings, which is a 
wholly owned government entity that prides itself for its ability to make investment decisions 
strictly on a commercial basis.  Temasek’s articulated policy with respect to GLCs is to play a 
key monitoring role in commercially viable and financially independent companies.  Due to 
Temasek’s stake in GLCs, it is possible that some politicians are appointed on behalf of Temasek.  
It may then be argued that these appointees, in protecting the interests of Temasek, also 
maximize share value, as long as: (1) Temasek does not influence the government to show 
favoritism at the expense of competitors, and (2) it is not possible for Temasek or its appointees 
to share in the private benefits of control.   
There are a few anecdotes to reinforce the view that politically connected firms in 
Singapore do not enjoy favoritism from the government.  For example, since April 2007, the 
postal sector has witnessed new players introduced to both domestic and international mail 
services, after a 15-year monopoly held by SingPost.8
 
  Also, the corporate tax rate is applied 
uniformly across all businesses and industries with the expectation that no firm is specially 
protected by the government to reap economic benefits. 
III. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Political connection, or the lack thereof, is a double-edged sword; it can either enhance or 
jeopardize a firm’s value.  In China, Xu, Zhu, and Lin (2002) show that, when political control is 
curtailed, firm performance improves.  This happens when there is a resulting increase in a 
firm’s flexibility in labor deployment and in the enforcement of more effective corporate 
                                                 
8 Mr. Lee Hsien Yang, the brother of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, serves as an independent director on 
SingPost’s board. 
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governance mechanisms.  It is recognized, however, that some political appointees have 
conflicting objectives, such as maximizing employment or minimizing social costs, etc.   
Likewise, politically connected CEOs may have a deleterious effect rather than being 
helpful to firm performance.  Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2004) report that firms with politically-
connected CEOs underperform those without political connection by 37%, when measured by 
their firms’ three-year post-IPO stock returns.  In addition, performance measures (such as 
market-to-book value and return on assets) of state- controlled firms are found to be negatively 
related to the level of state ownership (Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007)).  Similarly, evidence from 
47 countries shows that politically connected firms underperform non-politically connected firms 
on an accounting basis, notwithstanding the fact that they are able to derive considerable benefits 
from their political connections (Faccio (2006)). 
One possible explanation for the underperformance of politically connected firms is that, 
when politicians channel resources toward favored firms, it can lead to a distortion of incentives, 
misallocation of investments, and an increase in corrupt activities (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)).  
On the other hand, with political connection, a firm may increase in value if it manages to extract 
unfair economic rents at the expense of competitors and consumers (e.g., Faccio (2006)).  
However, when all or more of the increase in firm value is consumed by politicians and their 
connected managers, less of any remaining value would be available to shareholders.  This is a 
form of agency problem where proper governance structures can help contain.  A subtle point to 
note is that good governance, which aims to increase share value, does not equate to good 
citizenship.  It is perfectly consistent for good governance firms to take advantage of political 
connection to increase share value under corrupt regimes.   
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If political connection were used as a prime determinant of profitability, it would induce 
distorted investment decisions (Faccio (2006)) and, consequently, lead to a lower firm value 
without it.  There is evidence in Indonesia of firms facing difficulties in building connections 
with a new government when their patron falls from power, causing those firms to underperform 
under the new regime and subsequently to turn to foreign financing (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 
(2006)). 
On the other hand, politically connected companies may benefit from easier access to 
debt financing, lower tax, and stronger market power (Faccio (2006)).  For example, Friedman 
(1999) reports that bankers are often compelled to extend loans for projects undertaken by 
politically connected firms, even when they are forecast to be unprofitable, thus extracting rents 
from the banks.  Such evidence, together with others (e.g., Johnson, Kochhar, Mitton, and 
Tamirisa (2006), Khwaja and Mian (2004), and Sapienza (2004)) provide further support that the 
discrepancy in the lending behavior of state-owned banks is affected by the electoral results of 
the party affiliated with the bank. Such actions represent a wealth transfer from citizens or 
consumers to the firm, leading to an increase in firm value. 
Besides easier access to credit, politically connected firms may enjoy other forms of 
benefit.  Some public officials and politicians may clandestinely sell underprovided goods and a 
spectrum of rent-generating advantages to individual firms, often allowing firms to shape the 
rules of the games to their advantage at considerable social cost (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 
(2000)).  Alternatively, directors may be appointed for their knowledge, experience with 
government procedures, and insights in government policy, their ability to persuade the 
government in favor of the firm’s interest, or to forestall governmental action that is pernicious 
to the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber (2001)).  Imai (2006) shows that powerful business groups 
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strive to directly hold influential public offices in order to change economic policies to their 
favor as companies with political connection are more likely to win a project tender because of 
the protection from corrupt politicians or bureaucrats.  Thus, the award of government contracts 
to companies without basic qualifications, resources, and expertise is, not surprisingly, often 
linked to political parties (Donatella and Vannucci (1997)).9
It is evident that politically connected directors have the power and capability of bringing 
benefits to firms by influencing the laws under which their firms operate, as well as the 
possibility of winning government contracts for their firms and, in the process, enhance firm 
value.  Crudely put, politically connected board members can either influence the transfer of 
wealth from competitors or consumers to their firms (Faccio (2006)) or corruptly extract 
economic rents from the firm for their personal gain.  We test the following null hypothesis. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1:  In the absence of political corruption, political connections of firms have little or 
no effect on firm value. 
 
                                                 
9 It is noted that companies that form political connections with government officials in order to obtain perks or 
preferential treatment are characteristic not only of countries traditionally labeled as corrupt, but many may also be 
found in countries known for their transparent systems.  In the United States, about half of those who leave 
government jobs, including some who have served in Congress, end up working as lobbyists, who can command a 
higher remuneration.  Oftentimes, as in Japan, they end up working for corporations that try to influence the 
decisions of government agencies they had left.  These examples just demonstrate how imperfectly political 
corruption is measured.  Many countries that have no corruption by bureaucrats and policemen, etc., nevertheless 
have politicians influenced by money spent on lobbying and campaign contributions by interested groups and firms. 
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The alternative to hypothesis 1 is that political connections of firms could lead to private 
gains to the firms’ shareholders.  In Singapore, offences from and sanctions on corruption are set 
out in the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is vigilantly enforced.  Punishment on corruption 
includes a fine of up to S$100,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or both, 
in addition to other potential related criminal charges.  With such stringent regulations in place to 
uphold the integrity of the business environment, it is therefore relatively difficult for directors to 
corruptly exploit their connections to bring economic benefits to their firms, or to abuse their 
position in the firm for their own personal economic, social or political interests.  Thus, we 
hypothesize that firms are generally not expected to gain from their political connections.  
However, we leave open the possibility that some firms operating in a more highly regulated 
industry may deem it advantageous to appoint directors who are politically connected, but not 
corrupt, to their board.  A low corruption government has two means of limiting the value of 
political connections to firms.  One, it is more likely to appoint, or allow to be appointed, 
officials who are not corrupt onto corporate boards.  Two, it would set up mechanisms to identify 
and punish corrupt officials. 
We are not examining how corporate governance is affected by political connection. 
Rather, the relevant issue is whether a firm’s desire to take advantage of their political 
connection can be increased or reduced with good/poor governance.  As mentioned earlier, good 
governance should not be confused with good citizenship.  With poor governance, managers 
share the spoils from their connections with politicians at the expense of shareholders. 10
                                                 
10 A politically connected director who is highly influential may result in a conflict of interest when the director 
exploits the firm for his personal political, social, and economic interests, thereby directing benefits to himself.  
Chang and Wong (2004) show that the decision-making power of local party committees relative to managers is 
negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting that political costs associated with party control over 
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However, it is also consistent that good governance firms, in the pursuit of share value 
maximization, develop political connections and lobby politicians.  Having established that the 
quality of corporate governance has no relevance to a firm’s desire to use political connection for 
private gains of managers or shareholders, the relevant question is whether politically connected 
directors from low corruption countries can help improve corporate governance more than that of 
other independent outside directors.  To give empirical content to this statement, we hypothesize 
that: 
  
Hypothesis 2:  In a low political corruption environment, politically connected directors have a 
neutral effect on the quality of corporate governance. 
 
 Alternatively, non-corrupt politically connected directors may act as monitors of their 
firm to ensure that good corporate governance practices are upheld. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
managers are more inimical to firm performance than are managers’ agency problems.  Fan, Wong, and Zhang 
(2007) report that a detailed examination of board composition at the time of an IPO shows that firms with 
politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint bureaucrats to their management team and board of directors.  
At the same time, they appoint fewer directors with a germane professional background or prior business experience 
and do not appoint any representatives of minority shareholders.  Such actions drastically lower the level of 
corporate governance as management ends up being monitored lightly so as to ease the scrutiny of their rent-seeking 
activities. 
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IV. Data and Methodology 
A. Data and Sample Design 
Underpricing is a common phenomenon in IPO that is followed by abnormally low 
returns in the long-run (see Ritter (1991)).  IPOs allow us to investigate the wholesale 
introduction of all politically connected directors the first time the firms are introduced to the 
capital market.  The design eliminates the need to adjust for the timing of an anticipation effect 
and the incremental value of a single appointee in later years.  
The IPO data are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue 
database and covers all IPOs during 1998-2006.  We use the SDC database to obtain basic 
information on offer dates, offer prices, the number of shares issued, net proceeds, and the 
number of lead and co-lead managers.  Prior to the IPO, we extract the latest financial 
information, such as total assets, total liabilities, net income, and debt-to-asset ratio from the 
individual firms’ IPO prospectus.  Post IPO, financial data such as total assets, current assets, 
current liabilities, long-term debt, preferred stock, and market value of common equity are 
obtained from the Thomson One Banker database.  From the IPO prospectus, we obtain the 
profile of each director.  A total of 2,540 directors are covered in the sample of 387 listed 
companies.  We manually identify directors that are politically connected according to the 
definition described in Section I.   
Table I presents summary descriptive statistics of the entire sample of newly listed 
companies.  Panel A, B, and C contain their offer, firm, and corporate governance characteristics, 
respectively.  On average, the sample firms offer 74.18 million shares in their IPO, garnering net 
proceeds of $21.06 million each.  We note that PC firms, on average, issue 63.6 million shares 
which is less than those issued by non-PC firms.  The median difference of these two numbers is 
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statistically significant at the 10% level.  The net proceeds raised by PC firms also tend to be 
lower than those of non-PC firms. The average offer price is $0.47 with a mean offer-to-close 
returns of 24%.  On average, there are 1.33 underwriters per issue.  Firm characteristics are 
described in Panel B.  We note that the market value of each firm’s equity averages $183.75 
million with an average of 355.79 million shares outstanding.  PC firms have average total assets 
valued at $124.5 million whereas the corresponding figure for non-PC firms is a higher at $211.8 
million.  The market value of PC firms at the time of IPO is also lower than that of non-PC firms. 
In Panel C, we report that the management of PC firms on average own 44.5% of their 
firms compared to 41% of non-PC firms.  The average number of executive directors among PC 
firms is 2.78 compared to 2.90 for non-PC firms.  PC firms report a significantly lower number 
of chairmen who also serve as CEOs than non-PC firms.  The average age of the directors is 46.6 
years with those of PC firms being slightly older.  Overall, compared to non-PC firms, PC firms 
tend to be of a smaller size with a higher degree of management ownership and have older 
directors.  The evidence from Table I shows that PC firms have a higher (though not statistically 
significant) percentage of management ownership of the firm’s equity and are of a smaller size 
(again not statistically significant) in terms of IPO proceeds, asset size, and market value at the 
time of IPO.  Firms with such characteristics may typically be expected to have a lower valuation 
compared to larger firms and those that have a lower percentage of management ownership.  
However, the presence of PC directors appears to have somewhat neutralized such effects with 
their association with better corporate governance practices such as non-duality in their 
Chairman and CEO, and fewer executive directors. 
[Insert Table I here] 
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The sample consists of 161 politically connected companies and 226 non-politically 
connected companies that are newly listed over a 9-year period from 1998-2006.  This translates 
to 41.60% of the sample IPO companies that are deemed to have political connection.  In 
addition, from the profile of the 212 politically connected directors that have been identified, we 
document in Table II that 74.5% of these are acting as independent directors on the board.  
Moreover, 34.0% are current political appointees and 19.3% are former political appointees, 
15.6% are politically connected chairmen, 21.2% are former cabinet ministers in the Singapore 
government, 2.4% are either military leaders or ambassadors of Singapore, while members of the 
parliament account for 54.7% of politically connected directors.  It is noted that current serving 
ministers are not permitted to sit on corporate boards. 
[Insert Table II here] 
 Table III presents the background of politically connected directors, including their age, 
business-related education and work experience, and the number of directorships that they hold.  
We note that current (former) political appointees on corporate boards have worked a median 
total of 24 (27) years, 11 (16) of which were spent in government or in the senior civil service.  
This implies that politically connected directors have had a total of 11 to 13 years of business 
and professional experience which is not insignificant.11
[Insert Table III here] 
  Such experience may be attractive to 
firms operating in certain highly regulated industries. 
 
                                                 
11 The corresponding background experience of directors of non-politically connected firms is not complete nor 
consistently available.  Thus, comparisons between the two types of firms cannot be properly made, 
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B. Firm Valuation Using Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is an important and widely accepted measure of corporate performance.  As 
such, we make use of it as a proxy for firm value, which is the ratio of the market value of a 
company’s assets (measured by the market value of outstanding stock and debt) to the 
replacement costs of the company’s assets, and is approximated by: 
(1) 
)(
)()()()()(
TABV
CABVLTDBVCLBVPSBVCSMVQ −+++=  
where MV(CS) is the market value of common shares, BV(PS) the book value of preferred 
shares, BV(CL) the book value of current liabilities, BV(LTD) the book value of long term debt, 
BV(CA) the book value of current assets, and BV(TA) the book value of total assets.  This 
simplified Q measure has been shown to account for at least 96.6% of the variability of Tobin’s 
Q (Chung and Pruitt, 1994).  A Tobin’s Q that is greater than one indicates that the company has 
a market value greater than its recorded assets, which can be attributed to intellectual capital or 
positive market sentiment of the company.  As such, a higher Tobin’s Q value is associated with 
superior firm value. 
We compute the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  Specifically, we subtract the industry 
median Tobin’s Q based on 2-digit SIC code from the sample firm’s Tobin’s Q.  By doing this, 
we are able to detect whether the sample firm outperforms the industry and, at the same time, 
control for any industry-related biases. 
 
C. Methodology 
We employ both univariate and multivariate analyses to test our hypotheses.  We 
examine the association between firm value and political connection by performing linear 
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regressions on Tobin’s Q for each of the three years and median of three years after an IPO 
against alternative political connection definitions.  We run the following main regression:   
(2) 
εββββ
ββββββ
++++
++++++=
MktvalGLCExchangeLeverage
ngUnderpriciDiragetIndependenDualityPolconnectValue
9876
543210  
where the dependent variable, Value, refers to the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of the firm one, 
two, and three years after IPO listing and the median industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q over the three 
years.  Polconnect refers to political connection measured by the ratio of the number of 
politically connected directors to the total number of board members.  Control variables used in 
the regression models are as follows.  Duality refers to the presence of a CEO who is also the 
chairman.  Independent refers to the percentage of directors on the board who are outside 
directors.  Dirage is the average age of directors.  Underpricing is the offer-to-close return 
computed as the difference between the first trading day’s closing and offer price as a percentage 
of the offer price.  Leverage is measured by the debt-to-asset ratio.  Exchange is a dummy 
variable which takes on the value of one if a firm is listed on the SGX main board, and zero 
otherwise.  GLC is a dummy variable with a value of one if it is a subsidiary of Temasek, and 
zero otherwise.12
In addition to the inclusion of several control variables, robustness checks are performed 
using a number of alternative definitions of political connection.  These include using political 
  Mktval refers to the natural logarithm of market value defined as the first day’s 
closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after the IPO. 
                                                 
12 These are government-linked companies (GLC) in which Temasek Holdings, the investment holding arm of the 
Singapore Government, has at least a 20% stake.  Examples of GLCs include some of the largest companies in 
Singapore such as Singtel, DBS Bank, Singapore Airlines, PSA International, SMRT Corporation, Singapore Power, 
and Neptune Oriental Lines.  In our IPO sample, the GLC firms include Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing, 
Singapore Airport Terminal Services, Singapore Post Ltd., Olam International Ltd., etc. 
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connection as a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one when at least one director is 
politically connected, and taking the natural logarithm of the number of politically connected 
directors.  Additionally, in place of these variables, we employ dummy variables to reflect the 
status of directors as current or former political appointees. 
The control variables included in this study are supported by previous research (see, for 
example, Ang and Ding (2006), Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2006), and Leuz and Oberholzer-
Gee (2003)) and can be grouped into two categories.  (1) Firm specific control variables, such as 
firm size and leverage.  These include Mktval, which is the natural logarithm of a firm’s first day 
post-IPO market value, used as a measure of firm size.  Leverage is used as a proxy for mapping 
the risk profile of a company.  (2) Control variables that capture differences in corporate 
governance among the firms.  A GLC dummy takes on a value of one when a company is 
government-linked, and zero if otherwise.  It is noted that GLCs have been shown to provide 
superior returns (on both assets and equity) and are valued more highly through their better 
management of expenses than non-GLCs (Ang and Ding (2006)).13
In order to examine the effect of corporate governance on firm value while considering a 
firm’s level of political connection, two variables, the percentage of independent directors and 
duality, are used as governance proxies.  Director independence is an indicator of the presence of 
a strong and independent board, whereas duality illustrates an appropriate balance of power, 
increased accountability, and greater capacity of the board for independent decision-making if 
the chairman and CEO positions are held by separate persons.  With an effective board, the 
opportunities for controlling shareholders and management to expropriate funds will, hopefully, 
be reduced. 
 
                                                 
13 Investors in the Singaporean market appear to value the higher standards of corporate governance found in GLCs.   
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V. Results and Analysis 
A. Univariate Analysis 
Using independent t-tests and Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, we examine the differences in 
means and medians, respectively, of the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q valuation for one, two, and 
three years after an IPO and the median industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q over all three years after an 
IPO listing between politically connected firms and those that are not politically connected.  The 
findings for industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q valuation are presented in Table IV, which shows that 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is not statistically significant between the two groups.  This suggests 
that political connection does not necessarily contribute to a higher firm value and that the 
benefits that such a connection might bring appear to be limited, supporting Hypothesis 1.  
[Insert Table IV here] 
The abnormal stock returns of politically and non-politically connected firms for one, two, 
and three years after an IPO are shown in Table V.  The mean and median values show that 
abnormal stock returns of politically connected firms do not outperform non-politically 
connected firms up to three years after an IPO as both the results of the t-test and Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test are not statistically significant.  Again, our evidence does not support 
shareholders having benefitted from the appointment of politically connected directors. 
[Insert Table V here] 
We examine the differences in accounting performance of the politically connected and 
non-connected firms and report the median values of the profit margin, cash flows from 
operating, ROA, ROE, and ROIC for 1, 2, 3 years, and the median 3-year post IPO in Table VI.   
In general, from the results in Panel A, we do not find any significant differences in the 
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accounting performance between the two types of firms.  However, if we limit the sample to the 
more regulated industries only, the results in Panel B show that the profit margin and cash flow 
from operations in the one-year post-IPO period is significantly higher among PC firms than 
non-PC firms.  These findings indicate that politically connected directors are associated with 
indicators of profitability and firm value within the first year of an IPO among firms that are 
more highly regulated. 
[Insert Table VI here] 
 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
The initial results (not reported) of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (a proxy for firm value for each of the three years and the median of 
the three years after an IPO listing) as the key dependent variable show that political connection, 
which is expressed as a percentage of politically connected directors on the board, does not have 
a strong predictive power in explaining firm value.  Political connection is found to be not 
statistically significant in explaining industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q over various years.  We 
therefore cannot reject hypothesis 1 that political connection is not associated with firm value.  
Similar results (not reported) are obtained when the political connection percentage variable is 
replaced by a political connection dummy variable and the natural logarithm of the number of 
politically connected directors. 
However, upon further investigation, when we break down the sample according to the 
two-digit SIC, we find that, in certain industries, political connection appears to be more 
important than in others.  These are those that belong to industries that tend to be subject to more 
stringent government regulation such as electrical and electronic equipment (SIC 36), Holding 
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and other investment offices (SIC 67), general building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred 
products (SIC 20), and rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30).14
[Insert Table VII and VIII here] 
  The findings for 
these industries (Table VII) show that the interaction between political connection and a 
particular industry is significant at least at the 10% level in its three-year median industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q.  As these industries carry higher regulatory risks, such as not knowing the 
appropriate regulations, their interpretation, and/or procedures to observe them, etc., PC directors 
may play the role of helping firms alleviate/mitigate these risks by providing the appropriate 
advice, while being mindful of any potential conflicts of interests.  Our results reveal that 
companies operating in these industries have a positive and significant addition to their firm 
value due to their political connection based on the three-year median post-IPO industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q.  The results using abnormal stork returns (Table VIII) largely corroborate with those 
of the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
Given the existence of stringent laws (viz the Prevention of Corruption Act) that are 
strictly enforced, with its attendant criminal and civil penalties against corruption in Singapore, 
together with the country’s high ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index, it is highly probable that any corrupt official will be very quickly brought to task.  As 
documented earlier, since PC directors are associated with better governance practices, their 
presence on corporate boards may thus compel firms to better adhere to the appropriate 
regulations.  We are not claiming that PC firms do not receive government contracts or any 
                                                 
14 Industries that are subject to a more stringent regulatory environment are: Electronic and electronic equipment 
(SIC 36) which is governed by the Infocomm Authority of Singapore’s Electronic Transactions Act; Holding and 
other investment offices (SIC 67) which is regulated by the various securities and financial acts of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore; General building contractors (SIC 15), by the Building and Construction Authority; Food 
and kindred products (SIC 20), through the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority; and Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastics products (SIC 30), by the Rubber Association of Singapore, among others. 
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preferential treatment.  Rather, by virtue of their being perceived as having good governance 
under a low corruption environment and which observe government regulations, such companies 
are likely to be attractive to both private businesses and governments for suitable business 
alliances.  Our findings provide evidence that it is possible for political connection to be 
independent of corruption.   
The results for governance show that Duality is negatively and significantly related to 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the second year post-IPO, whereas Independent is positive and 
significant for the median of the three years industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q after an IPO.  Dirage is 
negative and significant for the one year industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q post-IPO.  We also 
investigate the interaction effect between political connection and two governance variables 
(duality and board independence) and find insignificant results (not reported).  This implies that 
politically connected firms in a low corruption environment, regardless of their corporate 
governance, do not reduce firm value, supporting hypothesis 2. 
 For greater robustness of our results, we have allowed for finer classifications of political 
connection (see Table II), that is, we further divide these PC directors into: politically connected 
chairman/CEO, current political appointees, former political appointees, members of parliament, 
former ministers, and senior civil servants.  The regression results (Tables IX and X) for each 
type of political connection show that such connections add little to firm value.  In Table IX and 
X, besides investigating the value effects of different political connection classifications, we 
include a dummy variable, Reg Ind, that represents the five regulated industries identified in 
Table VII to have a significant contribution to the value of firms with PC directors.  We find 
from the Tobin’s Q results in Table IX that firms with politically connected chairmen or CEOs 
are associated with a significant positive value effect.  From Table X, Senior Civil Servants 
24 
 
contribute to a significant positive abnormal return three years post-IPO.  All other forms of 
political connection have either a very weak or no impact on firm value. 
[Insert Table IX and X here] 
Further analysis of the five regulated industries (see Table XI) reveals that, compared to 
firms that have no political connection within the same industries, PC firms have a smaller board 
size, less occurrence of duality in the Chairman-CEO, a larger independent directors-to-board 
size ratio, a smaller percentage of executive directors, slightly older directors, a larger percentage 
of management ownership, and a higher proportion of GLCs.  These differences, though not 
statistically significant, provide anecdotal evidence of the composition of PC boards. 
[Insert Table XI here] 
We further investigate the impact from a major event: a change in Singapore’s Code of 
Corporate Governance, which was issued July 14, 2005, requires all listed companies to disclose 
their corporate governance practices and explain deviations from the Code in their annual reports 
for AGMs held from January 1, 2007 onwards.  Our results on the announcement effect reveal 
that PC directors do not add value to their firms both before and after the imposition of the new 
disclosure requirement.  However, as shown in Table XII, after controlling for the presence of 
PC directors, firms in the more highly regulated industries appear to have a statistically 
significant impact on firm value as measured by the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
[Insert Table XII here] 
We provide results of a logistic regression in Table XIII to reflect the demand for 
politically connected directors.  The coefficient for director age is found to be positively 
significant.  This means that PC firms have directors that are more experienced in guiding their 
firms than non-PC firms.  PC firms also appear to have stronger corporate governance as 
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evidenced by their lower likelihood of duality in their Chairman/CEO and a smaller percentage 
of executive directors.   
[Insert Table XIII here] 
On the whole, the results show that, in Singapore, political connection in a non-corrupt 
regime in general does not affect firm value.  However, firms in industries that are more highly 
regulated appear to receive some benefit in terms of higher firm valuation from their political 
connections.  In particular, companies with a politically connected Chairman/CEO or Senior 
Civil Servant on their board benefit the most in terms of a positive effect on firm value.  PC 
firms, by virtue of their being perceived as having good governance under a low corruption 
environment and which observe government regulations, such companies may be attractive 
business partners to other businesses and governments.   
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
Political connection is a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, firm value can be 
jeopardized if exploiting such connections distort incentives, misallocate investment, and 
increase the extent of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)).  On the other hand, politically 
connected companies may benefit through easier access to debt financing, lower tax, and 
stronger market power (Faccio (2006)).  Although the effect of political connections has been 
previously investigated, our contribution is to examine for the first time the impact of politically 
connected directors on the value of firms operating in an environment where the perceived level 
of corruption is comparatively low, that is due to better institution that is not confounded by 
favorable social and cultural factors.  Singapore is ideal for the study as it is not only among the 
countries with the lowest level of corruption, it is also free of confounding factors such as an 
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innate culture among other countries with the lowest political corruption.  We study this issue at 
a firm’s inception (i.e., at IPO) where most of the new politically connected directors are 
appointed at the same time and their impact, if any, has not been anticipated as would be the case 
at any arbitrary time after an IPO. 
We study the effect of political connection on the value of a company in a low political 
corruption environment by examining the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and the excess returns of 
newly-listed companies from 1998 to 2006.  Firm value, within three years from the issue of an 
IPO, is found largely to be independent of a firm’s political connection, even after controlling for 
differences in corporate governance and firm characteristics.  Importantly, such connections do 
not reduce firm value.  However, when the sample is broken down in terms of industry, we find 
that firms operating in a more highly regulated environment appear to receive some benefit of a 
higher firm valuation from their political connection, especially among those with a politically 
connected Chairman/CEO or Senior Civil Servant on their board.  As PC directors have been 
shown to be associated with better governance practices, their presence on corporate boards may 
thus compel firms to better adhere to government regulations.  Thus, because they are perceived 
as having good governance under a low corruption environment and which observe government 
regulations, other firms and governments may be attracted to forming business relationships with 
PC firms.     
We find that firms with politically connected directors are associated with good 
governance practices such as non-duality in their Chairman and CEO and fewer executive 
directors.  We show that PC firms have higher managerial ownership and tend to be smaller than 
non-PC firms.  Firms with such characteristics may typically be expected to have a lower 
valuation compared to those that are larger or have a lower percentage of management ownership.  
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Our results show that the presence of PC directors appears to have somewhat neutralized any 
negative effects with its association with better corporate governance.  Thus, having a politically 
connected director on the board may be used as a signal by a firm to investors that it is subject to 
adequate appropriate monitoring mechanisms.  As the supply of good candidates for outside 
independent directors is often limited, firms would be inclined to invite such “politicians” to 
serve on their board, not because of their political connections and potential economic payoffs 
but as a means of expanding their list of good candidates for independent directors. 
In conclusion, this study suggests that, despite the lack of strong economic value that 
political connection per se brings to firms, politically connected directors may still contribute to 
the firm when they serve as independent directors within a non-corrupt political environment.  
We provide evidence that companies in certain highly regulated industries may find that having 
certain types of directors who are politically connected could have a positive and significant 
impact on their firm’s value. 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Politically- and Non-Politically-Connected 
 
This table presents the mean and median values of the offer, firm and corporate governance characteristics of politically- and non-politically-
connected in panel A, B and C, respectively.  In panel A, we report the offer characteristics, i.e., shares offered, net proceeds, offer price, offer to 
close return, and number of underwriters.  In panel B, we report the firm characteristics such as net sales, total assets, total liabilities, debt-to-assets, 
ROA, EPS, market value, and shares outstanding.  In panel C, we report institutional ownership, management ownership, number of board 
members, number of independent directors, number of chairman-ceo (duality), number of executive directors, age of directors, and government 
linked corporation (GLC).  t-statistics and z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used for the test of differences in the mean and 
median, respectively.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 
Total Politically-Connected 
Non-Politically 
Connected 
Difference 
(Politically – Non-Politically) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A Offer Characteristics 
Shares Offered (million) 74.175 44.400 63.618 39.100 77.706 46.013 -14.087 -6.913* 
Net Proceeds (US$ million) 21.055 6.937 18.343 6.466 21.963 7.049 -3.620 -0.583 
Offer Price (S$) 0.472 0.260 0.621 0.260 0.422 0.260 0.199 0.000 
Offer to Close Return 0.238 0.114 0.229 0.068 0.241 0.116 -0.013 -0.048 
Number of Underwriters 1.331 1.000 1.330 1.000 1.331 1.000 -0.001 0.000 
Panel B Firm Characteristics 
Net Sales (S$ million) 84.804 37.620 80.490 40.825 107.456 38.675 -26.966 2.150 
Total Assets (S$ million) 178.414 34.457 124.460 35.279 211.818 35.936 -87.358 -0.658 
Total Liabilities (S$ million) 85.714 18.218 58.977 18.731 100.789 19.520 -41.812 -0.788 
Debt-to-Assets 0.282 0.236 0.244 0.225 0.300 0.254 -0.057** -0.030 
ROA 0.285 0.130 0.173 0.131 0.306 0.127 -0.133 0.005 
EPS (S$) 4.403 2.930 3.689 2.995 4.999 2.915 -1.311 0.080 
Market Value (S$ million) 183.748 68.901 162.729 69.163 214.713 71.058 -51.984 -1.895 
Shares Outstanding (million) 355.785 202.948 283.573 206.975 399.145 219.853 -115.572 -12.878 
Panel C Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Institutional Ownership 0.486 0.536 0.475 0.510 0.496 0.550 -0.021 -0.040 
Management Ownership 0.426 0.4141 0.445 0.447 0.410 0.375 0.035 0.072 
No. of Board Members 6.563 6.000 6.515 6.000 6.684 6.000 -0.169 0.000 
No. of Independent Directors 2.416 2.000 2.417 2.000 2.472 2.000 -0.055 0.000 
No. of Chairman-CEO (Duality) 0.615 1.000 0.505 1.000 0.623 1.000 -0.118** 0.000** 
No. of Executive Directors 2.920 3.000 2.777 3.000 2.896 3.000 -0.119 0.000 
Age of Directors 46.576 47.000 47.859 48.000 46.382 46.000 1.477*** 2.000*** 
GLC 0.040 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.001 0.000 
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Table II. Types of Politically Connected Directors 
 
This table reports the number of directors and number of firms for different types of politically-
connected directors based on 387 IPO firms from 1998 to 2006.  Current (Former) political 
appointees are currently (previously) serving in government.  Politically connected chairmen or 
independent directors are those who are related to the government.  Members of Parliament 
(MPs) include directors who are current or former MPs elected as the peoples’ representative in 
the parliament.  Former ministers are directors who have previously served in a cabinet position.   
Senior civil servants include senior military personnel, permanent secretaries and parliament 
secretaries working in their respective ministries.  The percentage values in parentheses measure 
the ratio of each type of directors to the total number of politically-connected directors or each 
type of firm to the total number of politically-connected firms. 
 
Types of Political Connection No. of Directors 
(%) 
  No. of Firms 
(%) 
N 106 
(100%) 
97 
(100%) 
Current Political Appointees 38 
(36%) 
35 
(36%) 
Former Political Appointees 96 
(91%) 
67 
(69%) 
Politically Connected Chairmen 14 
(13%) 
14 
(14%) 
Politically Connected Independent Directors 94 
(89%) 
80 
(82%) 
Members of Parliament (MPs) 94 
(89%) 
81 
(84%) 
Current 37 
(35%) 
31 
(32%) 
Former 34 
(32%) 
30 
(31%) 
Former Ministers 23 
(22%) 
23 
(24%) 
Senior Civil Servants 17 
(16%) 
17 
(17%) 
Current 1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
Former 16 
(15%) 
16 
(16%) 
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Table III. Background of Politically-Connected Directors 
 
This table reports the backgrounds of the different types of politically-connected directors.  We collect the directors’ backgrounds from the IPO prospectus 
including years served in politics, years of work experiences, number of present directorships as at IPOs, number of past directorships prior to IPOs, age of 
directors, business-related education and business-related industry experience. 
 
 
Current Appointees Former Appointees 
Current & Former 
MPs Former Minister 
Senior Civil 
Servants 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Years Served in Politics 10.97 11.00 16.79 16.00 14.79 16.00 20.11 21.00 21.06 28.00 
Years of Work Experiences 23.45 23.50 24.88 26.50 23.48 23.00 27.73 30.00 30.65 30.00 
No. of Present Directorships 12.40 11.00 15.72 12.00 15.24 12.00 17.99 14.00 9.76 8.00 
No. of Past Directorships 9.28 7.00 13.05 6.00 11.60 6.00 16.34 9.00 10.18 6.00 
Age of Directors 46.76 47.00 57.39 58.75 53.03 53.00 60.09 61.00 62.41 64.00 
 
Number of Firms Number of Firms Number of Firms Number of Firms Number of Firms 
Business-Related Education 14 
 
45 
 
50 
 
19 
 
13 
 Business-Related Industry Experience 21 
 
38 
 
50 
 
15 
 
12 
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Table IV. Firm Value in Post IPO Years 
 
This table reports the mean and median of the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for politically and 
non-politically connected firms in the post-IPO years, specifically, one, two, and three years 
after an IPO.  Post Median refers to the median industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for all three post–
IPO periods.  Tobin’s Q is computed based on the Chung and Pruitt (1994) method as follows. 
)(
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where MV(CS) is the market value of common shares, BV(PS) the book value of preferred 
shares, BV(CL) the book value of current liabilities, BV(LTD) the book value of long term 
debt, BV(CA) the book value of current assets, and BV(TA) the book value of total assets.  We 
compute the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by subtracting the industry median from the sample 
firm’s industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  t-statistics and z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test are in the parentheses for mean and median, respectively. 
 
  Politically Connected Non-Politically Connected Difference 
1-year mean 0.30 0.17 0.13 
    (0.75) 
 median 0.10 0.09 0.01 
    (0.35) 
 N 61 199  
2-year mean 0.27 0.07 0.20 
    (0.77) 
 median 0.03 0.01 0.02 
    (0.43) 
 N 63 193  
3-year mean 0.46 0.21 0.25 
    (0.72) 
 median 0.10 0.08 0.02 
    (0.53) 
 N 58 170  
Post Median mean 0.23 0.08 0.15 
    (0.23) 
 median -0.04 -0.002 -0.038 
    (-0.15) 
 N 48 154  
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Table V. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Post IPO Years 
 
This table reports the mean and median of the cumulative abnormal returns for political- and 
non-political-connected firms in post-IPO years.  Specifically, we compute the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for 1-, 2- and 3-year after IPO.  The abnormal return is the difference 
between the daily returns and the market returns.  The market return is computed based on the 
Singapore Straits Times Index (STI).  t-statistics and z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test are in the parentheses for mean and median, respectively.  ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
  Politically Connected Non-Politically Connected Difference 
1-year mean -0.17 -0.20 0.03 
    (0.55) 
 median -0.24 -0.20 -0.04 
    (-0.49) 
 N 75 234  
2-year mean -0.35 -0.33 -0.02 
    (-0.16) 
 median -0.52 -0.48 -0.04 
    (-0.20) 
 N 54 195  
3-year mean -0.51 -0.44 -0.07 
    (-0.67) 
 median -0.65 -0.72 0.07 
    (0.91) 
 N 34 129  
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Table VI. Accounting Performance of Politically and Non-Politically Connected IPOs 
 
This table reports the median values of the accounting variables for politically and non-politically connected firms in the post-IPO years, 
specifically, one, two, and three years after an IPO.  Post Median refers to the median for all three post–IPO periods.  The accounting variables 
include profit margin, cash flows from operating, Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC).  Z-
statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test is used for the median test between politically and non-politically connected firms. 
 
  
Politically Connected Non-Politically Connected 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
Test 
Panel A: Full Sample 
    Profit Margin 1-year 7.395 7.930 0.783 
 
2-year 5.695 4.935 0.826 
 
3-year 4.645 3.960 0.633 
 
post median 5.970 5.480 0.661 
Cash Flows from Operations 1-year 1.905 1.930 0.468 
 
2-year 2.560 2.235 1.411 
 
3-year 2.440 2.130 0.430 
 
post median 1.780 1.665 0.041 
ROA 1-year 8.760 7.850 0.430 
 
2-year 5.730 6.390 -0.495 
 
3-year 4.745 5.080 -0.287 
 
post median 4.940 5.525 -0.537 
ROE 1-year 14.600 13.030 0.577 
 
2-year 9.640 10.555 0.181 
 
3-year 7.675 7.930 0.076 
 
post median 7.940 8.480 0.046 
ROIC 1-year 11.720 10.365 0.190 
 
2-year 7.920 8.010 -0.502 
 
3-year 5.950 7.480 -0.554 
 
post median 6.920 7.675 -0.692 
Panel B: Regulated Industries 
    Profit Margin 1-year 4.700 2.970 1.603* 
 
2-year 1.688 -0.198 0.908 
 
3-year -0.063 0.135 0.131 
 
post median 0.766 0.290 0.597 
Cash Flows from Operations 1-year 4.950 -1.965 2.013** 
 
2-year 0.298 -1.668 0.908 
 
3-year -1.450 -1.743 0.090 
 
post median -1.160 -1.620 0.682 
ROA 1-year 4.663 2.730 0.686 
 
2-year 1.680 -0.090 0.528 
 
3-year -0.230 -0.850 0.475 
 
post median 0.694 -0.188 0.203 
ROE 1-year 3.265 0.588 0.881 
 
2-year 3.420 -1.545 0.979 
 
3-year 1.145 -4.890 1.247 
 
post median 2.585 -2.085 1.116 
ROIC 1-year 3.495 2.960 0.227 
 
2-year 1.290 -1.380 0.825 
 
3-year -0.108 -2.843 1.030 
 
post median 0.410 -0.734 0.475 
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Table VII. Regression Results of Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q 
 
This table presents the regression results for the abnormal firm value.  The industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured by the sample firm’s Tobin’s 
Q minus the industry median Tobin’s Q.  The industry classification is based on the 2-digit SIC code.  The dependent variables AQ_post1yr, 
AQ_post2yr, AQ_post3yr and AQ_median are the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in post-IPO one, two, three years, and the median industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q over three years, respectively. Polconnect is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the director is politically-connected; 
otherwise 0.  Independent is the percentage of independent directors on the board.  Duality occurs when the chairman is also the CEO.  
Independent refers to outside unrelated directors.  Dirage is the average age of the firm’s directors.  Underpricing is computed as the difference 
between the first day’s closing price and offer price as a percentage of the offer price.  Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.  Exchange is a 
dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is listed on the main board of the SGX and zero if otherwise.  GLC is a dummy variable 
taking on the value of one if the firm is a government-linked corporation and zero if otherwise.  Market Value is defined as the first day’s closing 
price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after the IPO.  Industry 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7, 8, 9 and 10 are dummy variables taking the value of 
1 if the 2-digit SIC codes are 36, 67, 73, 87, 28, 15, 20, 30, 50 and 35, respectively; otherwise 0.   ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively, using White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
 
 
AQ_post1yr AQ_post2yr AQ_post3yr AQ_median 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 5.782** 6.137** 9.214 9.659 0.973 1.226 -0.502 -0.249 
Polconnect 0.884 0.681 0.801 0.032 0.930 0.382 0.265 -2.772 
Duality -0.170 -0.087 -0.375** -0.356* -0.256 -0.210 -0.257 -0.187 
Independent -0.098 -0.241 0.006 -0.073 1.348 1.220 2.056* 1.970** 
Dirage -1.785*** -1.922*** -2.502 -2.630 -0.835 -0.902 -0.150 -0.166 
Underpricing 0.037 0.057 -0.419* -0.420* -0.143 -0.112 -0.041 0.039 
Leverage 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.340 -0.395 0.672 0.595 0.515 0.458 
Exchange 0.001 -0.018 -0.183 -0.178 0.077 0.072 -0.074 -0.114 
GLC -0.186 -0.186 0.141 0.146 0.004 0.017 0.092 0.215 
Market Value 0.123** 0.140** 0.118 0.130* 0.168* 0.176* 0.040 0.038 
Industry1 -0.036 0.010 -0.098 -0.230 -0.259 -0.372* -0.192 -0.486** 
Industry2 -0.089 -0.115 -0.218 -0.289 -0.377* -0.451** -0.271 -0.470 
Industry3 -0.352 -0.840*** -0.739*** -0.967*** 0.096 -0.268 -0.118 -0.642 
Industry4 -0.049 -0.222* -0.520 -0.692 -0.804** -0.901** -0.452 -0.573 
Industry5 0.317 0.474* 0.082 0.250 0.024 0.187 0.147 0.142 
Industry6 -0.121 -0.173 -0.035 0.118 0.165 0.196 0.098 -0.609* 
Industry7 -0.011 0.031 -0.083 -0.138 -0.172 -0.211 0.048 -0.144 
Industry8 0.475 0.444 -0.376 -0.638* -0.588** -0.748*** -0.408 -0.610** 
Industry9 -0.170 -0.137 -0.273** -0.273* -0.382** -0.329** -0.488** -0.598*** 
Industry10 0.361 0.400 0.116 0.098 -0.128 -0.161 0.136 -0.049 
Polconnect*Industry1 
 
-1.130 
 
2.579 
 
2.106 
 
6.260* 
Polconnect*Industry2 
 
0.517 
 
2.610 
 
2.918 
 
5.183* 
Polconnect*Industry3 
 
10.943* 
 
4.884 
 
11.746 
 
15.949 
Polconnect*Industry4 
 
1.964 
 
2.414 
 
1.178 
 
2.839 
Polconnect*Industry5 
 
-2.160 
 
-1.779 
 
-1.889 
 
1.223 
Polconnect*Industry6 
 
0.420 
 
-1.437 
 
-0.118 
 
8.835** 
Polconnect*Industry7 
 
-1.465 
 
1.135 
 
0.919 
 
4.586** 
Polconnect*Industry8 
 
1.002 
 
4.572 
 
2.007 
 
4.555* 
Polconnect*Industry9 
 
-1.147 
 
-0.086 
 
-2.344 
 
1.843 
Polconnect*Industry10 
 
-2.218 
 
0.025 
 
0.672 
 
3.805 
Adj. R2 0.033 0.072 0.053 0.031 -0.019 -0.033 -0.049 -0.037 
F-Statistic 1.45* 1.67** 1.72* 1.27 0.79 0.76 0.52 0.76 
N 252 252 246 246 219 219 195 195 
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Table VIII. Table Regression Results of Abnormal Stock Returns 
 
This table presents the regression results for the buy and hold abnormal stock returns.  The abnormal return is measured by the sample firm’s 
stock return minus the market return proxied by the Straits Times Index (STI) in Singapore.  The dependent variables XRET1, XRET2, XRET3 
are the buy and hold abnormal stock returns compounding in post-IPO one, two, and three years, respectively. Polconnect is the dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the director is politically-connected; otherwise 0.  It is proxied by politically-connected chairman/CEO, current 
political appointees, former political appointees, member of parliaments, former ministers, and military and senior civil servants in model 1 to 6.  
Duality occurs when the chairman is also the CEO.  Independent is the percentage of independent directors on the board.  Dirage is the average 
age of the firm’s directors.  Underpricing is computed as the difference between the first day’s closing price and offer price as a percentage of 
the offer price.  Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.  Exchange is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is listed on 
the main board of the SGX and zero if otherwise.  GLC is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is a government-linked 
corporation and zero if otherwise.  Market Value is defined as the first day’s closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after 
the IPO.  Industry 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7, 8, 9 and 10 are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the 2-digit SIC codes are 36, 67, 73, 87, 28, 15, 20, 
30, 50 and 35, respectively; otherwise 0.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively, 
using White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
 
 
XRET1 XRET2 XRET3 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.787 -0.961 -2.791* -2.759* -2.414 -2.047 
Polconnect 0.249 -0.162 -0.273 -1.444*** -0.738 -1.592* 
Duality 0.096** 0.107*** 0.008 0.051 -0.173 -0.138 
Independent 0.152 0.101 -0.542 -0.603* -0.250 -0.222 
Dirage -0.260 -0.173 0.171 0.218 0.140 0.125 
Underpricing -0.146*** -0.130*** -0.216** -0.170* -0.257* -0.234* 
Leverage -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.016 -0.027 
Exchange 0.069 0.057 -0.016 -0.004 -0.248* -0.243** 
GLC -0.098 -0.074 -0.211 -0.203 -0.703** -0.658** 
Market Value 0.132*** 0.121*** 0.200*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.158*** 
Industry1 -0.023 -0.014 -0.236* -0.279* -0.372** -0.396* 
Industry2 -0.078 -0.149** -0.293** -0.401*** -0.390** -0.418*** 
Industry3 -0.096 -0.088 -0.353*** -0.504*** -0.307** -0.459*** 
Industry4 -0.044 -0.160 -0.131 -0.270* 0.493 0.453 
Industry5 -0.137 -0.093 -0.204 -0.259 -0.201 -0.281* 
Industry6 0.198 0.232 -0.194 -0.254 -0.499*** 0.143 
Industry7 -0.047 -0.213** -0.060 -0.307 -0.280* -0.453*** 
Industry8 -0.028 -0.099 -0.238* -0.269 -0.170 -0.151 
Industry9 -0.081 -0.114* -0.307*** -0.382*** -0.176 -0.284** 
Industry10 -0.160** -0.183** -0.230 -0.329 -0.238 -0.253 
Polconnect*Industry1 
 
-0.513 
 
0.377 
 
-0.050 
Polconnect*Industry2 
 
1.984*** 
 
3.446** 
 
0.391 
Polconnect*Industry3 
 
-0.498 
 
4.345** 
 
2.969** 
Polconnect*Industry4 
 
1.623* 
 
2.625** 
 
1.162 
Polconnect*Industry5 
 
-0.415 
 
1.008 
 
1.284 
Polconnect*Industry6 
 
-0.115 
 
1.371 
 
-1.243 
Polconnect*Industry7 
 
4.975* 
 
5.908** 
 
6.255*** 
Polconnect*Industry8 
 
1.235* 
 
0.752 
 
0.082 
Polconnect*Industry9 
 
0.420 
 
1.220** 
 
2.216** 
Polconnect*Industry10 
 
0.171 
 
2.179 
 
-0.584 
Adj. R2 0.182 0.227 0.097 0.103 0.059 0.024 
F-Statistic 4.45*** 3.98*** 2.35*** 1.95*** 1.51* 1.14 
N 296 296 241 241 154 154 
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Table IX. Table Regression Results of Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q 
 
This table presents the regression results for the abnormal firm value.  The industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured by the sample firm’s 
Tobin’s Q minus the industry median Tobin’s Q.  The industry classification is based on the 2-digit SIC code.  The dependent variables 
AQ_post1yr, AQ_post2yr, AQ_post3yr and AQ_median are the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in post-IPO one, two, three years, and the median 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q over three years, respectively. Polconnect is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the director is 
politically-connected; otherwise 0.  It is proxied by politically-connected chairman or CEO, current political appointees, former political 
appointees, member of parliaments, former ministers, and military and senior civil servants in model 1 to 6.  Duality occurs when the chairman 
is also the CEO.  Independent is the percentage of independent directors on the board.  Dirage is the average age of the firm’s directors.  
Underpricing is computed as the difference between the first day’s closing price and offer price as a percentage of the offer price.  Leverage is 
total debt divided by total assets.  Exchange is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is listed on the main board of the SGX 
and zero if otherwise.  GLC is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is a government-linked corporation and zero if otherwise.  
Market Value is defined as the first day’s closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after the IPO.  Reg Ind is a dummy 
variable representing the more highly regulated industries including electrical and electronic equipment (SIC 36), Holding and other investment 
offices (SIC 67), general building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred products (SIC 20), and rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 
30).  Polconnect*Reg Ind is the interaction term of Polconnect and Reg Ind.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
for a two-tailed test, respectively, using White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
 
Model 1: Politically-Connected Chairman or CEO Model 2: Current Political Appointees 
 
AQ_post1yr AQ_post2yr AQ_post3yr AQ_median AQ_post1yr AQ_post2yr AQ_post3yr AQ_median 
Intercept 5.530** 7.570 1.363 -0.382 5.446** 8.259 1.176 0.205 
Polconnect -0.246 -0.473* 0.421 -0.420 -0.005 -0.222 0.727 0.164 
Duality -0.255* -0.370** -0.207 -0.253 -0.228* -0.354** -0.219 -0.238 
Independent 0.154 0.101 1.494 2.163** 0.194 0.059 1.544 2.140** 
Dirage -1.698*** -2.090 -0.984 -0.279 -1.695*** -2.263 -1.011 -0.467 
Underpricing 0.087 -0.381 -0.199 -0.087 0.085 -0.386* -0.217 -0.106 
Leverage 0.002*** -0.368 0.496 0.409 0.002*** -0.408 0.431 0.340 
Exchange 0.033 -0.165 0.071 -0.080 0.044 -0.181 0.051 -0.112 
GLC 0.237 0.254 0.087 -0.050 0.251 0.322* 0.023 -0.024 
Market Value 0.111* 0.109 0.181* 0.072 0.113* 0.110* 0.205** 0.087 
Reg Ind 0.021 0.016 -0.139 -0.058 0.035 -0.060 -0.108 -0.073 
Polconnect*Reg Ind -0.254 0.214 0.114 0.911** -0.151 1.005 -0.245 0.389 
Adj. R2 0.036 0.046 0.006 -0.015 0.033 0.054 0.028 -0.013 
F-Statistic 1.91** 2.14** 1.12 0.72 1.83** 2.36** 1.61* 0.77 
N 267 262 234 2.08 267 262 234 208 
 
Model 3: Former Political Appointees Model 4: Members of Parliament 
 
AQ_post1yr AQ_post2yr AQ_post3yr AQ_median AQ_post1yr AQ_post2yr AQ_post3yr AQ_median 
Intercept 5.738** 7.951 0.724 -0.517 5.464** 8.007 1.713 1.713 
Polconnect 0.389 0.461 -0.361* -0.176 0.268 0.241 0.242 0.242 
Duality -0.203 -0.317** -0.255 -0.249 -0.198 -0.329** -0.217 -0.217 
Independent 0.269 0.218 1.500 2.219** 0.230 0.241 1.493 1.493 
Dirage -1.845*** -2.309 -0.776 -0.277 -1.764*** -2.340 -1.136 -1.136 
Underpricing 0.082 -0.388* -0.200 -0.087 0.089 -0.402* -0.196 -0.196 
Leverage 0.001*** -0.285 0.468 0.415 0.002*** -0.317 0.472 0.472 
Exchange 0.030 -0.182 0.087 -0.082 0.034 -0.177 0.062 0.062 
GLC 0.241 0.260 0.035 -0.069 0.233 0.217 0.013 0.013 
Market Value 0.131** 0.132* 0.177* 0.081 0.128** 0.141** 0.202** 0.202** 
Reg Ind 0.060 0.090 -0.245 -0.097 0.069 -0.011 -0.216 -0.216 
Polconnect*Reg Ind -0.250 -0.369 0.579* 0.452 -0.230 0.169 0.209 0.209 
Adj. R2 0.047 0.055 0.009 -0.016 0.041 0.052 0.012 -0.011 
F-Statistic 2.19** 2.38*** 1.19 0.71 2.03** 2.31** 1.25 0.79 
N 267 262 234 208 267 262 234 208 
 
Model 5: Former Ministers Model 6: Senior Civil Servants 
 
AQ_post1yr AQ_post2yr AQ_post3yr AQ_median AQ_post1yr AQ_post2yr AQ_post3yr AQ_median 
Intercept 5.478** 7.834 1.207 -0.120 5.462** 7.817 1.268 -0.115 
Polconnect -0.098 -0.115 -0.165 -0.004 0.223 0.164 0.022 0.112 
Duality -0.232* -0.348** -0.240 -0.242 -0.236* -0.353** -0.237 -0.241 
Independent 0.174 0.132 1.414 2.199** 0.251 0.214 1.446 2.198** 
Dirage -1.690*** -2.181 -0.901 -0.369 -1.719*** -2.208 -0.934 -0.381 
Underpricing 0.085 -0.391* -0.188 -0.090 0.090 -0.389 -0.187 -0.091 
Leverage 0.002*** -0.346 0.478 0.398 0.002*** -0.344 0.476 0.403 
Exchange 0.042 -0.165 0.074 -0.090 0.049 -0.164 0.074 -0.090 
GLC 0.253 0.274 0.059 -0.032 0.257 0.278 0.066 -0.032 
Market Value 0.110* 0.112* 0.174* 0.077 0.117** 0.119* 0.178* 0.080 
Reg Ind 0.021 0.026 -0.162 -0.042 0.015 0.020 -0.161 -0.036 
Polconnect*Reg Ind 0.017 0.118 0.093 0.201 0.222 0.282 0.059 0.145 
Adj. R2 0.033 0.041 0.002 -0.019 0.036 0.043 0.002 -0.018 
F-Statistic 1.82* 2.00** 1.05 0.65 1.91** 2.07** 1.04 0.66 
N 267 262 234 208 267 262 234 208 
 39 
Table X. Table Regression Results of Abnormal Stock Returns 
 
This table presents the regression results for the buy and hold abnormal stock returns.  The abnormal return is measured by the sample firm’s stock return minus the market return proxied by the Straits 
Times Index (STI) in Singapore.  The dependent variables XRET1, XRET2, XRET3 are the buy and hold abnormal stock returns compounding in post-IPO one, two, and three years, respectively. Polconnect 
is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the director is politically-connected; otherwise 0.  It is proxied by politically-connected chairman/CEO, current political appointees, former political 
appointees, member of parliaments, former ministers, and military and senior civil servants in model 1 to 6.  Duality occurs when the chairman is also the CEO.  Independent is the percentage of 
independent directors on the board.  Dirage is the average age of the firm’s directors.  Underpricing is computed as the difference between the first day’s closing price and offer price as a percentage of the 
offer price.  Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.  Exchange is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is listed on the main board of the SGX and zero if otherwise.  GLC is a 
dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is a government-linked corporation and zero if otherwise.  Market Value is defined as the first day’s closing price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding after the IPO.  Reg Ind is a dummy variable representing the more highly regulated industries including electrical and electronic equipment (SIC 36), Holding and other investment offices (SIC 
67), general building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred products (SIC 20), and rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30).  Polconnect*Reg Ind is the interaction term of Polconnect and Reg 
Ind.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively, using White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
 
 
XRET1 XRET2 XRET3 XRET1 XRET2 XRET3 XRET1 XRET2 XRET3 
 
Model 1: Politically-Connected Chairman/CEO Model 2: Current Political Appointees Model 3: Former Political Appointees 
Intercept -0.487 -1.962 -2.192 -0.478 -1.906 -2.098 -0.222 -1.991 -2.458 
Polconnect -0.025 -0.102 -0.218 -0.021 -0.014 0.061 0.030 -0.135 -0.225* 
Duality 0.062 -0.016 -0.204* 0.062 -0.010 -0.194* 0.076** -0.014 -0.222* 
Independent 0.108 -0.456 0.334 0.114 -0.452 -0.035 0.078 -0.438 -0.274 
Dirage -0.297 -0.071 0.052 -0.300 -0.094 -0.091 -0.369* -0.057 0.041 
Underpricing -0.124** -0.210** -0.306** -0.122** -0.213** -0.309** -0.127** -0.204** -0.299** 
Leverage -0.0003** -0.0004* 0.003 -0.0003** -0.0004* 0.016 -0.0003** -0.0004* -0.009 
Exchange 0.089** 0.006 -0.211* 0.088** 0.0002 -0.208* 0.092** 0.021 -0.198 
GLC -0.040 -0.063 -0.233 -0.040 -0.062 -0.219 -0.015 -0.065 -0.235 
Market Value 0.117*** 0.194*** 0.226*** 0.117*** 0.197*** 0.227*** 0.117*** 0.192*** 0.219*** 
Reg Ind -0.008 -0.145* -0.294*** -0.008 -0.151* -0.298*** -0.055 -0.193** -0.315*** 
Polconnect*Reg Ind -0.004 0.120 0.103 -0.007 0.130 0.080 0.252* 0.334* 0.120 
Adj. R2 0.154 0.087 0.083 0.154 0.087 0.082 0.181 0.096 0.093 
F-Statistic 6.20*** 3.21*** 2.35** 6.21*** 3.21*** 2.34** 7.34*** 3.45*** 2.53*** 
N 316 255 165 316 255 165 316 255 165 
 
Model 4: MPs Model 5: Former Ministers Model 6: Senior Civil Servants 
Intercept -0.301 -1.923 -2.220 -0.454 -1.896 -2.090 -0.483 -1.933 -2.105 
Polconnect 0.010 -0.077 -0.106 0.116 -0.037 -0.097 -0.0002 -0.204* -0.036 
Duality 0.077** -0.002 -0.211* 0.064* -0.017 -0.210* 0.064* -0.013 -0.208* 
Independent 0.065 -0.461 -0.261 0.123 -0.453 -0.317 0.103 -0.439 -0.285 
Dirage -0.351* -0.081 -0.044 -0.317* -0.084 -0.071 -0.299 -0.075 -0.102 
Underpricing -0.126** -0.202** -0.312** -0.125** -0.215** -0.311** -0.124** -0.205** -0.328** 
Leverage -0.0003*** -0.0005** 0.003 -0.0003** -0.0004* 0.016 -0.0003** -0.0004* 0.038 
Exchange 0.093** 0.009 -0.213* 0.085** -0.002 -0.212* 0.088** 0.011 -0.220* 
GLC -0.020 -0.063 -0.234 -0.035 -0.061 -0.230 -0.039 -0.063 -0.237 
Market Value 0.119*** 0.195*** 0.225*** 0.120*** 0.193*** 0.222*** 0.117*** 0.192*** 0.232*** 
Reg Ind -0.053 -0.194** -0.306*** 0.0002 -0.137* -0.289*** -0.003 -0.147* -0.304*** 
Polconnect*Reg Ind 0.216 0.293 0.082 -0.137 -0.118 -0.107 -0.121 0.207 0.528*** 
Adj. R2 0.172 0.094 0.084 0.158 0.088 0.083 0.155 0.089 0.084 
F-Statistic 6.96*** 3.40*** 2.37*** 6.38*** 3.22*** 2.35** 6.25*** 3.26*** 2.37*** 
N 316 255 165 316 255 165 316 255 165 
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Table XI. Board Composition of Regulated Industries 
 
This reports the descriptive statistics of board composition for politically connected and non-politically connected firms in the 
more highly regulated industries.  The more highly regulated industries including electrical and electronic equipment (SIC 36), 
Holding and other investment offices (SIC 67), general building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred products (SIC 20), and 
rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30).  The board composition includes board size, duality, independent 
directors, independent directors/board size, executive directors, executive directors/board size, director age, management 
ownership and government linked corporation (GLC).  t-statistics and z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used 
to test for mean and median differences, respectively.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a 
two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 
Politically Connected Non-Politically Connected Difference 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Board Size 6.697 7.000 6.891 6.000 -0.194 1.000 
Duality 0.455 0.000 0.598 1.000 -0.143 -1.000 
Independent Directors 2.394 2.000 2.424 2.000 -0.030 0.000 
Independent Directors/Board Size 0.363 0.333 0.360 0.333 0.003 0.000 
Executive Directors 2.879 3.000 3.239 3.000 -0.360 0.000 
Executive Directors/Board Size 0.440 0.400 0.461 0.500 -0.021 -0.100 
Director Age 48.167 48.000 46.500 46.000 1.667 2.000** 
Management Ownership 0.409 0.330 0.393 0.343 0.016 -0.013 
GLC 0.030 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.009 0.000 
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Table XII. Regression Analysis Under New Corporate Governance Code 
 
This table presents the regression results for the abnormal firm value during the pre- and post-event.  The event is the new 
corporate governance code adopted in July 14, 2005.  The industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured by the sample firm’s 
Tobin’s Q minus the industry median Tobin’s Q.  The industry classification is based on the 2-digit SIC code.  The dependent 
variables AQ_post1yr is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in post-IPO one year. Polconnect is the dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if the director is politically-connected; otherwise 0.  It is proxied by politically-connected chairman or CEO, 
current political appointees, former political appointees, member of parliaments, former ministers, and military and senior civil 
servants in model 1 to 6.  Duality occurs when the chairman is also the CEO.  Independent refers to the percentage of outside 
unrelated directors.  Dirage is the average age of the firm’s directors.  Underpricing is computed as the difference between the 
first day’s closing price and offer price as a percentage of the offer price.  Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.  
Exchange is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is listed on the main board of the SGX and zero if 
otherwise.  GLC is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is a government-linked corporation and zero if 
otherwise.  Market Value is defined as the first day’s closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after the 
IPO.  Reg Ind is a dummy variable representing the more highly regulated industries including electrical and electronic 
equipment (SIC 36), Holding and other investment offices (SIC 67), general building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred 
products (SIC 20), and rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30).  Event is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the IPO is issued under the new corporate governance code regime, July 14, 2005; otherwise 0.  ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively, using White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics. 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Full Period Pre-Event Post-Event 
Intercept 5.553** 4.979* 0.026 
 
(2.01) (1.64) (0.01) 
Polconnect 0.841 0.767 1.892 
 
(1.20) (1.07) (0.63) 
Duality -0.190 -0.264* 0.433 
 
(-1.32) (-1.89) (1.17) 
Independent 0.210 0.382 0.584 
 
(0.35) (0.63) (0.26) 
Dirage -1.758*** -1.533** -1.172 
 
(-2.63) (-2.19) (-0.92) 
Underpricing 0.070 -0.072 1.585*** 
 
(0.48) (-0.45) (5.30) 
Leverage 0.002*** -0.468 0.001 
 
(3.31) (-1.34) (1.08) 
Exchange 0.019 -0.074 -0.594 
 
(0.14) (-0.53) (-1.51) 
GLC -0.161 -0.024 -1.993*** 
 
(-0.73) (-0.14) (-3.51) 
Market Value 0.121** 0.130** 0.363** 
 
(2.06) (2.05) (2.27) 
Reg Ind 0.048 -0.026 1.024** 
 
(0.39) (-0.21) (1.96) 
Event -0.102 - - 
 
(-0.41) 
  Adj. R2 0.027 0.022 0.123 
F-Statistic 1.63* 1.50 1.39 
N 252 223 29 
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Table XIII. Logistic Regression Results of Politically Connected Directors 
 
This table presents the results of the demand for politically connected directors.  The dependent variable is the dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the IPO is the politically connected; otherwise 0.  Market Value is defined as the first day’s closing price multiplied by the number 
of shares outstanding after the IPO.  ROA is the return on assets prior to the IPO.  Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.  Underpricing is 
computed as the difference between the first day’s closing price and offer price as a percentage of the offer price.  GLC is a dummy variable 
taking on the value of one if the firm is a government-linked corporation and zero if otherwise.  Exchange is a dummy variable taking on the 
value of one if the firm is listed on the main board of the SGX and zero if otherwise.  Board Size is the total number of board members.  Duality 
occurs when the chairman is also the CEO.  Dirage is the average age of the firm’s directors.  Independent is the percentage of independent 
directors on the board.  IO is the institutional ownership at IPO.  Industry 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7, 8, 9 and 10 are dummy variables taking the value of 1 
if the 2-digit SIC codes are 36, 67, 73, 87, 28, 15, 20, 30, 50 and 35, respectively; otherwise 0.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively, using the Wald z-statistics. 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2.129 -0.273 -0.081 
Market Value -0.193 -0.236 -0.253 
ROA -0.043 -0.065 -0.073 
Leverage -0.012* -0.011 -0.014* 
Underpricing 0.114 0.273 0.324 
GLC 0.295 0.116 0.181 
Exchange 0.063 0.478 0.503 
Board Size 
 
-0.124 -0.128 
Duality 
 
-0.538* -0.589* 
Dirage 
 
0.087*** 0.091*** 
Indepedent 
 
-0.106 -0.041 
IO 
 
-0.005 -0.005 
Industry1 
  
-0.011 
Industry2 
  
-0.316 
Industry3 
  
0.395 
Industry4 
  
-0.584 
Industry5 
  
0.551 
Industry6 
  
0.740 
Industry7 
  
0.215 
Industry8 
  
0.234 
Industry9 
  
0.026 
Industry10 
  
-1.639 
Cox & Snell R2 0.017 0.077 0.101 
-2 Log Likelihood 407.62 304.89 297.34 
N 429 429 429 
 
 
